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Abstract
Compared with the U.S., the amplitude of the European monetary policy rate
cycle is strikingly narrow. Is it an evidence of a less reactive ECB? This observation
can certainly reflect the preferences and then the strategy of the ECB. But its greater
inertia must also be assessed in the light of the singularity of the European structure
and of the shocks hitting it. From this perspective, several contributions assert that
the nature, size and persistence of shocks mainly explain the different interest rate
setting. Therefore, they rely on the idea that both areas share the same monetary
policy rule and, more surprising, the same structure. This paper aims at examining
this conclusions with an alternative modelling. The results confirm that the euro area
and U.S. monetary policy rules are not fundamentally different. But we reject the
differences of nature and amplitude of shocks. What is often interpreted as such is in
fact the consequence of how distinctly both economies absorb shocks. So differences
in the amplitude of the interest rate cycles in both areas are basically explained by
structural dissimilarities.
Resume´
Compare´ au cas ame´ricain, l’amplitude du cycle mone´taire europe´en frappe par
son e´troitesse. Faut-il y voir la preuve d’une BCE moins re´active ? Ce constat peut
refle´ter les pre´fe´rences et donc la strate´gie de la BCE mais cette plus grande inertie
doit eˆtre e´tudie´e a` la lumie`re de la structure de l’e´conomie europe´enne et des chocs
qui l’affectent. Plusieurs contributions ante´rieures ont indique´ que la nature, la taille
et la persistance des chocs sont la principale origine des diffe´rences de fixation de
taux d’inte´reˆt. Par conse´quent, elles reposent sur l’ide´e que les deux zones partagent
la meˆme re`gle mone´taire, et plus e´tonnamment, les meˆmes structures e´conomiques.
Cet article examine donc ces conclusions avec une mode´lisation alternative. Les
re´sultats confirment que les re`gles ame´ricaine et europe´enne ne sont pas fondamen-
talement diffe´rentes. Mais nous rejetons les diffe´rences de nature et d’amplitude des
chocs e´conomiques. Ce qui est souvent interpre´te´ comme tel ne fait en re´alite´ que
refle´ter les diffe´rentes manie`res dont les deux e´conomies absorbent les chocs. Ainsi,
les diffe´rences d’amplitude des cycles mone´taires dans les deux zones s’expliquent
essentiellement par des divergences structurelles.
Keywords: Policy activism, structural divergence, interest rates, monetary policy
rules, macroeconomic shocks
JEL Code: C51, E52, E58
Introduction
’Too little, too late’, is the frequent comment about the stance of the European monetary
policy, in particular when the evolution of its policy rate is compared to the fed funds
rate (see fig. 1 in appendix). Excepted if a cyclical gap is assumed between the euro area
and the United States, the observed interest rates discrepancy leads to suppose that the
ECB is systematically late in comparison to the Fed, especially in case of cycle reversal.
Moreover, the ECB appears to be less dynamic. Between January 1999 and September
2007, the ECB moved its key interest rate 23 times, against 35 movements registered by
the Fed. Even more, between 1999 and 2005, the U.S. policy rate changes were twice as
frequent as the Euro rates moves (respectively 30 against 15). And since average interest
rate variations are not higher than the U.S. ones, the latters are logically more volatile than
the formers. The fed funds rate variance is 4.5 times higher than the European repo rate.
Can we deduce from this observation that the ECB is apathetic per se? More basically,
where does this difference come from?
Roughly, an economy consists of three elements: 1) a structure (which represents the
way the economy absorbs shocks and monetary policy impulses), 2) temporary shocks
and 3) a monetary policy based on an interest rate rule. This rule reacts to economic
variables (inflation rate and output gap) driven by the structure and temporary shocks.
Thus, despite appearances, it is possible that the ECB is per se as activist as the Fed, and
that the discrepancies observed ex post are due to radically different structural and cyclical
contexts in both areas. It is the reason why J-C. Trichet1 claims that ’activist is an attribute
that applies to a strategy, not to a policy path’. In his speech, J-C. Trichet asserts on the
one hand that both areas are structurally similar2 and on the other hand that the ECB and
the Fed subscribe to the same monetary policy conduct. Certainly, he acknowledges the
higher rigidity of the European economy, especially prices. But under cover of a credible
monetary policy, the anchor of expectations and wages on the inflation objective of the
ECB is so asserted that price stickiness does not imply too much inflation persistence. And
finally, the ECB president concludes that the differences of interest rate evolutions between
both areas are mainly explained by differences in shocks. The 2001 financial boom-bust
cycle illustrates his assertion, inasmuch as this event led to a favourable demand shock
in the United States (consumption and investment growth) instead of a negative supply
shock (decrease of the TFP) in the euro area3.
Precisely, the paper by Sahuc & Smets (2007) startlingly echoes those arguments. In-
deed, they claim that the interest rate divergences are explained by differences in shocks,
more than differences in structure or in monetary policy. Using a similar structural model
estimated with U.S. and EA data, Smets & Wouters (2005) also conlude that both areas
1Conference about ’Activism and Alertness in Monetary Policy ’ organised by the Bank of Spain on
’Central Banks in the 21st Century ’, 8 June 2006.
2M. Trichet asserts that ’the half –life of the effect of a shock to inflation is considerably less than one
year, which is close to the figure of USA’. This argument is debatable as we will see latter.
3According to J-C. Trichet, ‘The euro area seems to have had its fair share of stock market turbulence,
without enjoying the side benefit of improved supply conditions‘.
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are structurally similar. According to Christiano, Motto & Rostagno (2007), structural
and cyclical differences could explain some divergences concerning the evolution of output
and inflation. But since the ECB monetary policy rule implies more inertia than the U.S.
one, these divergences do not turn up on interest rate paths.
Nevertheless, these contributions suffer from factual and methodological inconsistencies.
First, it is difficult to admit that a young central bank, which is still establishing its
credibility, and which is not always well understood (in particular at its beginning), benefits
from an expectation channel that would be more obvious than in the United States. If,
as asserted by Christiano et al. (2007), under cover of an inertial monetary policy and its
subsequent expectation channel, the ECB needs not to move its rate as much as the Fed for
the same results, why does the Fed endeavour to be so dynamic in comparison? Moreover,
financing systems, labour markets, specializations, and price rigidities imply important
disparities between the two areas, to such an extent that their structural proximity is hard
to concede. Then, regarding shocks, the evolutions of consumption, investment and TFP
are more endogenous than what is implicitly assumed in these analyses. Effectively, both
areas lived the same financial boom-bust at the turning point of 2000. So, the differences
will not result from the nature of shocks but rather from how each economy reacts to
them. This draws the attention on the structural dissimularities only. Finally, given the
institutional and historical points which differentiate them, the ECB and the Fed monetary
policies are unlikely to be conducted similarly4.
Turning to methodology, these last references rely on structural DGSE models. But
despite some ad hoc accomodations (like backward looking price setting, capital adjustment
costs, autoregressive shocks, etc. . . ) they often do not duly consider the inertial behaviours
of agents and then sluggishness of data (see Fuhrer (1997), Estrella & Fuhrer (2002)). The
inertia ignored by these models is finally discharged in what is identified as ’shocks’, with
the risk to overestimate them if the economy is rigid. More basically, this models have not
demonstrated their superiority in terms of shock identifications. Moreover, the conclusion
of structural similarity muscles necessarily when the structure of both economies is identical
and established a priori, while only the calibration is supposed to be different. In this
respect, Smets & Wouters acknowledge: ’the more structure is imposed on the estimated
model, the more the results will be coloured by the selected theoretical specification’.
So, an alternative approach is desirable to fill this gap. Since imposing an a priori
structure is likely to pervert the conclusions, it is interesting to use VAR models, which
precisely get rid of this constraint. Indeed, they intend to ’let the data speak’, with
few structural preconceptions. Moreover these models duly consider the sluggishness of
macroeconomic variables. In this respect, they are often used as reference for analyzing
the dynamic of economies. We will then apply the method of counterfactual simulations to
VAR models estimated for the euro area and the U.S.. This method consists in replacing
successively the ECB monetary policy rule, the European shocks, and finally the European
4The Fed is explicitly mandated to take care of the output cycle (and not only to fight against inflation
as it is the case in the EA). Besides, the composition of monetary policy committees and the way they
come to a decision can induce more or less inertia. See for instance Gerlach-Kristen (2005). At least, the
preference parameters of the monetary authorities’ loss function should be different.
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structure by their U.S. counterparts. The subsequent changes on interest rates will allow
to reveal what are the essential sources of differences. The results of our simulations will
be submitted to econometrical tests that we expect to be more rigorous than the mere
graphical analyses used by the pre-cited articles.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section aims at formally
delivering the three sources of divergence between both areas (monetary policy, structures,
shocks). The second section explains the characteristics of the VAR models estimated for
both areas. Then we proceed to the counterfactual simulations, comparing successively
the monetary policies (section 3), the shocks (section 4) and the structures (section 5) of
the EA and the U.S.. We conclude that structures do explain the differences observed ex
post between the ECB and the Fed interest rates paths. This result is finally discussed in
section 6, where we seek to reveal the deep preference parameters of the Fed and to apply
them to the ECB monetary policy framework.
1 What are the potential sources of divergence?
The aim of this section is to develop the idea formulated in introduction, according to which
an economy can be reduced to four elements: a structure (F (.)), some temporary shocks
(εX), a monetary policy (hereafter MP) governed by a rule (f(.)), and some monetary
policy shocks (εi). Typically, the EA can be symbolized by the following system:{
X = F̂ (X) + εX
iEA = f̂(X) + εEAi
with X a vector of n state variables (∀n). Concretely, F̂ (.) is an estimated multidimensional
function and εX the vector of the associated error terms. These errors, which correspond
to the difference between the actual values and the values predicted by the estimated
structure, represent by definition the shocks that hit this structure. Next, iEA is the
short-term interest rate, i.e. the MP instrument which depends, through an estimated MP
rule fˆ(.), on the state variables of the system. The difference between the actual interest
rate and the estimated interest rate deduced from the rule constitutes the MP shocks
(including the discretionary part of the MP), noted εi. In sum, the model variables (X et
iEA) are guided by a structure F̂ (.), temporary shocks, a MP rule fˆ(.) and MP shocks (or
’surprises’). The U.S. can be represented following the same way:{
W = Ĝ(W ) + εW
iUS = ĝ(W ) + εUSi
A priori, its structure Ĝ(.), its shocks εW , its MP rule ĝ and / or its MP shocks ε
US
i are
distinct from their counterparts of the EU system.
Thereby, we resort to counterfactual simulations to detect the main cause(s) of diver-
gence. Concretely, successively substituing the EA structure, shocks, MP rule and MP
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shocks with their U.S. counterparts, we calculate pseudo European interest rates and test
if they are significantly different from the actual rate or if they come closer to the actual
U.S. rate. This implies four exams. Firstly, what would have happened if the ECB had
followed the U.S. MP rule? (Would the EA interest rate be closer to the U.S. rate?) The
response is given by the examination of the following simulated interest rate:
i˜EA = ĝ (X) + εEAi (1)
Secondly, what would be the EA interest rate if the European MP surprises had been
similar to the american ones? Solution is given by:
i˜EA = f̂
(
X̂
)
+ εUSi (2)
with X̂ the estimated endogenous of the European system, given that the European state
variables can be decomposed as X = X̂ + εX . Then, to determine to what extend the
cyclical differences are likely to explain the observed divergences between actual U.S. and
EA interest rates, εX has to be substituted with εW in the European system to deduce a
pseudo interest rate as:
i˜EA = f̂
(
X̂ + εW
)
+ εEAi (3)
In these cases, MP rules, MP shocks and structures remain proper to each area. Finally,
a pseudo interest rate can be calculated, under the assumption that the EA structure
correspounds to the U.S. one, everything else equal5 :
i˜EA = f̂
(
Ŵ + εX
)
+ εEAi (4)
In the end, this method allows to identify which sources of divergence among the four
contribute to explain the lower volatility of the European interest rate. Previously, it is
necessary to explain the models used to implement the generic method exposed so far.
2 Modeling the euro area and the United States
In the light of the arguments presented in introduction, VAR models are particularly
relevant in this problematic. They usually serve as reference models for stylized facts and
they get away from DGSE models which are inadequately discriminant and sometimes
empirically unsatisfying. Finally, in the perspective of counterfactual simulations, VAR
models benefit from few theoretical preconceptions.
5Symetrically, the same exercice done with the US economy would lead to the examination of the
respective following relations: i˜US = f̂ (W ) + εUSi , i˜
US = ĝ
(
Ŵ
)
+ εEAi , i˜
US = ĝ
(
Ŵ + εX
)
+ εEAi , and
i˜US = ĝ
(
X̂ + εW
)
+ εUSi .
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2.1 Models, data and estimation
The VAR model of the EA can be written as follows:
Xt = A1Xt−1 + . . .+ ApXt−p +BZt−k + t (5)
with X a five-element vector composed of the long term -real interest rate ρ, the output
gap y, the wage annual growth rate w, the inflation rate pi and the short- term nominal
interest rate i. For degrees of freedom purposes, VAR models require to be parsimonious
in terms of variables. This is why we only consider the most important variables at stake
in the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We also add the wage growth to capture
the institutional and cyclical divergences often observed between the U.S. and EA labour
markets (cf. Sahuc & Smets (2007), Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (2005a)).  is the
vector of innovations associated to the endogenous variables, i.e. (ερ, εy, εw, εpi, εi), which
respectively represent a shock on the long-term interest rate (or financial shock), a demand
shock, a labour shock, a supply shock and a MP shock. As the equation defining the short-
term interest rate (the last equation) is comparable to a MP rule, the shock εi stands for a
temporary deviation to the rule, that is central bank discretionary decisions6. The vector
Z = (z1, z2; . . .)
′ stands for commodity prices, exogenous variables in the VAR, insered in
order to limit the price puzzle effect (with k depending on its informational contribution).
The U.S. VAR model includes the same variables. U.S. data stems from Datastream.
All variables are seasonally adjusted. Exogeneous variable is the Goldman Sachs Commod-
ity Prices Index. The EA data come from the AWM database (see Fagan, Henry & Mestre
(2005)), updated in autumn 2006, up to the fourth quarter of 2005. These aggregated Eu-
ropean data are seasonally adjusted with the standard X-11 seasonal adjustment method
(via the X-11 procedure of SAS). For both areas, as the presence of a unit root can not
be excluded for the real GDP series, the output gap is not calculated following an usual
HP filter. Instead, it is defined as the residuals of the regression of the GDP on a constant
and a quadratic trend. Short term and long-term interest rates respectively correspound
to the 3-month monetary rate and the 10-year benchmark rate7.
Estimations covers the 1985-2005 period. The p order of VAR models is determined
with the parcimonious BIC criterion. Starting from this benchmark, VAR lags may be
augmented if the disturbances do not follow a white noise process (then p is increased until
the validation of white noise hypothesis). Finally, p = 3 for the EA and p = 5 for the
U.S.. Table 10 in appendix reports the results of normality and white noise tests applied
to disturbances series. In all cases, normality is accepted and serial correlation rejected.
6The backward looking feature of this MP rule can be justified by the unavailability of data in real time.
See McCallum & Nelson (1999). Moreover, as it is shown by a lot of reaction function estimates, the past
interest rate has to be added to the baseline Taylor rule for a good fitting, as it = β1it−1 + β2pit + β3yt,
with pit = (pit − p¯i). In this case, the MP rule can be written: it = β2
∑∞
n=0 β
n
1 pit−n + β3
∑∞
n=0 β
n
1 yt−n,
where reference to the past is far from negligeable.
7Preliminary unit root tests (ADF) reject the unit root hypothesis. Studying the cointegration is then
useless.
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Once these statistical imperatives satisfied, impulse response functions (IRF) are gen-
erated8 to assess the models dynamics (in the light of some well-known stylized facts) on
one hand, and to establish a first focus on the differences between both areas on the other
hand.
2.2 The main characteristics of the U.S. and EA models
Figure 2 represents the essential IRFs in the perspective of studying the transmission of
shocks and MP impulses. As a whole, it actually describes the textbook MP transmission
mechanism. In the euro area, the short-term interest rate has a positive effect on the long-
term interest rate. Given the Cholesky decomposition, this link is not contemporaneous.
In fact, if MP is credible, the long-term interest rate should anticipate the movement of
the short-term rate. But whatever the decomposition, the autoregressive structure of the
model makes it impossible to model, by definition. In sum, VAR models share the same
deficiency with structural theoritical models concerning the spread term modelling. Be
that as it may, the relation between both rates is positive and significant. Next, the long-
term interest rate impacts the output gap negatively. In accordance with the expected
transmission delay of MP, this influence is only significant after the 6th quarter following
the initial shock on the long term interest rate. Then it appears that a positive output gap
has a huge and positive incidence on inflation, to such an extend that a demand shock has
still an influence on inflation after 15 quarters.
On the U.S. side, the standard monetary policy transmission mechanism is also revealed,
but now with the short-term interest rate as main source (cf. fig. 2). Owing to institutionnal
matter9, the short-term interest rate is indeed more representative (than the long-term one)
of the U.S. MP transmission channels. Strictly speaking, the real short-term interest rate
should be considered. But expressed in real terms, the last equation of the U.S. VAR loses
some of its reaction function meaning, which makes the counterfactual simulations more
difficult. Certainly, IRF confirm the negative impact of the nominal short-term interest
rate on the output gap, with a significant effect that begins one year after the shock and
that is still effective 3 years latter. But the effect of the real short-term interest rate is
also verified: the response of the output gap is then significantly negative from the 7th
quarter and remains during the 6 following quarters. Finally, the output gap has a positive
incidence on inflation (which is significant for the 3 years following the initial shock).
Regarding the link between inflation and wages (cf. fig. 3) in the EA, we can observe
that an inflationary shock leads to an acceleration of wage growth, two quarters later (the
time needed for wage contracts to be adjusted). In turn, wages have a positive influence on
inflation (excepted the non-significant response of the inflation at the second quarter). In
addition, an inflationary shock graphically leads to a non-significant output gap increase
(cf. fig. 4). After the reaction of the monetary authorities, such a supply shock tends to
8IRFs are based on a Cholesky decomposition. Variables are declared following the order specified
in (5).
9See section 5.2.
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rather have a depressive impact (between the 7th and the 9th quarter). As expected, an
output gap rise pushes wage growth forward, with high persistance.
The price/wage spiral is less obvious to interpret for the U.S.. While an inflation in-
crease leads to a significant wage rise, the contrary is not true. Furthermore, an inflationary
shock does not have any significant effect on the output gap; as in the EA case, the rigorous
conduct of MP involves an output sacrifice three years after the supply shock (fig. 4). As
expected, a positive demand shock accelerates the wage growth, but without the persis-
tence previously observed for the EA. Note that despite the high inertia of some variables,
the U.S. and EA models are stable10. So both models are well behaved and respect the
usual econometrical requirements.
Finally, it is worth noting that counterfactual simulations rely on the assumption of
structural invariance to monetary policy. So this exercice is a priori subject to the Lucas
criticism. Nevertheless, while European economies experimented an unprecedented upset
in January 1999, the estimated VAR relations are strikingly stable. Indeed, table 11 in
appendix reproduces the results of the Hansen global stability test, applied to the five
relations of the EA VAR model. The null hypothesis of joint stability of parameters and
residual variance is always accepted. The conclusions of the Chow predictive test (with a
break point in 1999:Q1) are similar at the 5% level. So, all the relations are stable over the
estimation period. It is the case in particular for the monetary policy rule. Not only this
result attenuates the practical thrust of the Lucas criticism, but it also allows to consider
a common European monetary policy before 199911.
3 Comparing monetary policy rules
Are the difference in interest rate paths due to divergences of behaviour between the U.S.
and the EA central banks?
3.1 What are the lessons learned from the models?
The U.S. and EA MP rules are easily assimilated to a Taylor rule, as it is shown by figure 5,
where supply, demand and MP shocks are normalized to one for comparison purposes12.
In the EA, the nominal short-term interest rate responds positively and gradually to a
demand shock, with a hump-shaped profile. A one-point increase of the output gap leads
to a one-point interest rate rise after 6 months, which reachs more than one point and a
half after 6 quarters. Then European monetary authorities ease the monetary conditions,
so gradually that the interest rate response remains significant after 15 quarters. A one-
unit demand shock has more effect, both in terms of amplitude and length, in the EA
interest rate than in the U.S. one. The latter raises progressively, up to reach a bit less
10Indeed, all the eigenvalues modulus associated to the companion matrix of the model are less then
unity.
11In fact, convergence of national economies began in 1979 with the European Monetary System.
12In the other cases, initial shocks correspound to the standard deviation of the corresponding residuals.
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than one point increase 6 quarters after the initial disturbance. But this response ceases
to be significant after 10 quarters. In other words, the Fed’s easing is more prompt, as
if the U.S. authorities do not have to maintain a restrictive policy once the effects of the
inflationary shock are ready to be curbed.
The response of the interest rate to a supply shock is quite similar in the two areas: a
one-point increase of the inflation rate involves a gradual rise of interest rates (more than
1.2 points from one year). The easing is likewise gradual. The whole effect is absorbed
after two years and a half.
Lastly, a MP shock induces an immediate surge of the European short-term interest
rate, as would be the case with a more traditional augmented Taylor rule following an
AR(2) partial adjustment process, and with a first autocorrelation coefficient greater than
one13. As a second step, the interest rate converges overly gradually toward its equilibrium
(still significant after 3 years), following a sine curve. Certainly, this over-reaction is also
evident for the U.S.. But the U.S. interest rate converges more rapidly to the equilibrium.
Indeed, its response is no longer significant after 10 quarters, whereas it is still after 15
quarters in the EA.
Table 1 dispays a measure of the adjustment speed of interest rate, defined as the share
of its response after 6-months, one-year and two-years of its long-run effect14. The table
clearly indicates that the european MP confronted with a demand shock induces a slower
reaction than the U.S. policy. Whereas the European interest rate completes only 4.8% of
its total evolution 6 months after the initial shock, the U.S. rate reachs 16% of its total
adjustment. As a whole, the speed of convergence of the EA interest rate is three times
lower during the first two years. So much that two years latter, the U.S. interest rate has
almost reached its initial equilibrium, whereas the EA interest rate has only completed one
third of its total adjustment. The EA interest rate persistence is equally outstanding in
the case of discretionary MP shock. The U.S. interest rate evolves with a relative advance
of about one to two years. Concretely, one year (two years) after the initial disturbance,
the response of the EA interest rate stands for only 24% (36%) of its long term effects,
against 54% (80%) for the U.S.. On the other hand, responses to supply shocks exhibit
analogous convergence delays.
Figure 7 represents the estimated U.S. and EA interest rates and their respective MP
shocks. Clearly, it suggests that the possible difference between actual interest rate paths
can not be explained by differences about dicretionary stance. Indeed, table 9 confirms
that this MP disturbances have the same variance in both areas15. Therefore, it is more
relevant to focus on the difference of MP rules, instead of discretionary decisions, to find
an explanation of the difference of interest rate variances.
13See for instance the Fed’s reaction function estimated by Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998).
14Noting φij,t the dynamic multiplier deriving from the VMA representation of a VAR model, it rep-
resents the effect of an innovation εj occurring at date t on the ith variable, observed in t + m. The
measure of adjustment delay of the ith variable submitted to an idiosyncratic shock is then given by :∑m
t=0 |φij,t|/
∑∞
t=0 |φij,t| with i = j and m = {2, 4, 8} quarters. For the denominator, the sum stops when
φii,t is no longer significant.
15Moreover, table 3 points out that these series are correlated.
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euro area United States
Reponse of interest rate 6 months 1 Year 2 Years 6 months 1 Year 2 Years
to a shock on inflation 22% 40% 76% 22% 42% 75%
to a shock on the output gap 4.8% 12% 30% 16% 41% 92%
to an idiosyncratic shock 16% 24% 36% 37% 54% 80%
Table 1: Speed of adjustment of the Interest rate
3.2 Counterfactual exercice on policy rules
In accordance with (1), we determine what would have been the EA interest rate if the
European monetary authorities had followed the Fed’s rule during the 1999-2005 period.
As a whole, the results exhibited in table 2 lead to accept the equivalence of the EA
and the U.S. MP rules in terms of interest rate volatility. There is only one ambiguity
concerning the variance equality of the actual and the simulated (under European MP
rule hypothesis) U.S. interest rate: equality is accepted at the 5% but rejected at the 10%
level. Nevertheless, even if we conclude that the U.S. interest rate would have been less
volatile with the EA MP rule, such a transposition does not enable the U.S. rate to come
closer to the EA rate. Indeed, equality between the simulated U.S. rate and the EU rate
is rejected. So MP rule differences do not explain the divergences of interest rate paths.
If the European monetary authorities had followed the Fed’s rule, they would not have
appeared as more ’reactive’.
To be exhaustive about MP, we examine the differences due to MP shocks, according
to (2). Logically, given the mean and variance equalities of these disturbances, the second
part of table 2 indicates that the discretionary stance of monetary policies do not explain
the observed divergence of interest rate paths. Consequently, if the U.S. and EA interest
rates remain different despite analogous MP rules and MP shocks, the reasons for actual
divergences are of structural and/or cyclical order(s).
4 Comparing Shocks
Is the larger inertia of the European monetary policy due to smaller and less frequent
shocks? Figure 8 displays the shock series (supply, demand, labor, monetary policy) and
their variance16 over 1999-2005. Firstly, table 3 shows the correlations between the shocks
of each area. It confirms the well known resultat that long-term interest rates are correlated,
mainly because of international financial spillovers. Interestingly, we find that the financial
globalization makes this correlation even higher for the last sub-period. Supply shocks are
also strongly correlated, especially for the end of the period. Therefore, demand and labor
shocks are the only potential explanation for different monetary policy stances17.
16The persistence of shocks is not relevent in that matter since they are white noises.
17Cross correlations do not modify this conclusion.
9
euro area with the Fed Monetary Policy Rule
1999:1 - 2005:4 Variance Variance Equality
Actual EA interest rate 0.92 YES
Simulated EA interest rate 0.90 (SL=0.47)
U.S. with the EA Monetary Policy Rule
Variance Variance Equality
Actual U.S. interest rate 3.72 YES / NO
Simulated U.S. interest rate 2.11 (SL=0.07)
Actual EA interest rate 0.92 NO
Simulated U.S. interest rate 2.11 (SL=0.01)
euro area with the Fed Monetary Policy Shocks
Variance Variance Equality
Actual EA interest rate 0.92 YES
Simulated EA interest rate 0.69 (SL=0.22)
U.S. with the EA Monetary Policy Shocks
Variance Variance Equality
Actual U.S. interest rate 3.72 YES
Simulated U.S. interest rate 3.99 (SL=0.42)
Table 2: Tests on counterfactual interest rate series - Monetary Policy scenarios
Corr.
(
εEAρ,t ; ε
US
ρ,t
) (
εEAy,t ; ε
US
y,t
) (
εEAw,t ; ε
US
w,t
) (
εEApi,t ; ε
US
pi,t
) (
εEAi,t ; ε
US
i,t
)
1985-2005 0.25∗∗ 0.14 0.08 0.47∗∗∗∗ 0.17
1999-2005 0.36∗∗ 0.19 0.12 0.56∗∗∗ 0.31
*, ** : Rejection of the independence hypothesis at respectively 1 and 5% level.
Table 3: Correlation coefficients between historical shocks
Then historical decomposition enables to determine to what extent these shocks impact
prices, the output gap, wages and interest rates. Graph 9 gives some details about the
results for the 1999-2005 period. Each panel indicates the direction and the magnitude
the shocks have on the endogeneous variable. In the two regions, the output gap is mainly
affected by demand shocks. However, these latter lead to a lower output gap in the U.S.
but higher in the euro area early 2000’s. Conversely, the European output gap recently
underwent adverse demand shocks while the U.S. output gap is positively affected by
positive demand shocks. If we sort the other shocks by growing importance, we find labor
shocks in the eurozone while they have virtually no effect in the U.S., where supply shocks
are an important factor of output gap changes.
Similarly, wages are strongly impacted by demand shocks in the U.S.. As expected,
positive demand shocks raise wages and vice versa. Labour shocks are the second determi-
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nant of unexpected wage changes. Demand shocks also have a strong influence on wages
in the eurosystem but to a lesser extent than labour shocks.
Between 1999 and 2005, demand shocks were the main determinants of higher infla-
tionary pressures in the euro area as already mentionned by Christiano, Motto & Rostagno
(2005b). But this effect was mitigated by labour shocks, as a result of all European reforms
(to a more flexible labour market). Their very irregular contribtution of supply shocks also
accounts for their weakness. Conversely, supply shocks (associated with demand shocks)
in the U.S. are a major source of inflation changes. But in the 2000’s, those two shocks had
opposite effects and contributed to improve inflation stability. Labour shocks also played
an important role, especially by lowering inflation at the end of the period.
Finally, supply and demand shocks are the main determinants of U.S. interest rates
as expected in a Taylor rule framework. Since negative demand shocks cut output gap,
inflation and wages between 2001 and 2004, there is no surprise that they also have a
negative impact on the interest rate. Similarly, negative supply shocks tended to moderate
the increase in interest rates. Demand shocks are also important to explain interest rate
changes in the euro area (with a positive influence especially in the early 2000’s). But
supply shocks (except labour shocks) do not mitigate this impact because of their very
small magnitude. This result fits with ECB’s press releases which very mention labour
market evolutions. The Fed does not seem to pay so much attention to labour market. In
all cases, shocks or monetary surprises have a very small impact on endogeneous variables.
To sum up, it is hard to admitt that shocks are of the same nature in the two regions.
And even if they are, they have opposite effects. We observed no coincidence between the
contributions of each shocks for any endogeneous variables. On this issue, we share Sahuc
& Smets (2007)’s conclusions and Trichet (2006)’s statements.
But still, such a difference can not explain the smaller volatility of the European interest
rate. European shocks should be smaller or less volatile. And it is not the case according to
variance equality tests reported in table 4. In accordance with figure 8, this table indicates
that shocks on long-term interest rates, on inflation and on labor market18 are significantly
larger in the eurozone. Only demand shocks are slightly higher in the U.S. over 1999-2005,
as already shown by Sahuc & Smets (2007)19. Figure 8 however gives little evidence of a
shock being favorable or not for a region. And obviously, these differences do not justify a
stronger interest rate inertia (that is even the opposite). Eventually, as already mentionned
table 9, only the equality of variances can not be rejected.
18The magnitude of labour market shocks in Europe can be explained by the adjustements made in
reaction to structural reforms. Since the early 1990’s, all Europan countries have been promoting reforms
aiming at reducing the labor costs of low-skilled jobs, increasing the labor supply with tax credits, reducing
the legislation on employment protection, revising the conditions for unemployement benefits, changing
the legislation on length of work, the centralization level of wage negociations and the minimum wage, not
to mention the reforms on the pension system. Meanwhile, the U.S. experienced almost no reforms except
the implementation of the Earned Income Tax Credit and a higher age before having irght to pension
benefits in 2002.
19Howerver we do not share Smets & Wouters (2005) conclusion: while they state that the euro area
was more affected by negative supply shocks, the shocks we show here have the same variance in the two
regions.
11
V ar(εEAρ,t )
V ar(εUSρ,t )
V ar(εUSy,t )
V ar(εEAy,t )
V ar(εEAw,t)
V ar(εUSw,t)
V ar(εEApi,t )
V ar(εUSpi,t)
V ar(εEAi,t )
V ar(εUSi,t )
1985-2005 3, 53∗∗∗ 1.15 7.26∗∗∗ 4.74∗∗∗∗ 1.59∗
1999-2005 6.61∗∗∗ 1.61∗ 4.24∗∗∗ 6.21∗∗∗ (a)1.23
*, **, *** : Rejection of the null hypothesis of variance equality at
respectively 10, 5 and 1% level. (a) corresponds to V
(
εUSi,t
)
/V
(
εEAi,t
)
.
Table 4: Tests of Variance equality
The shock series should not be able to explain the differences in interest rate volatility
between the two regions. The results of conterfactual simulations based on equation (3),
summarized in table 5, confirm these results. If European shocks would have been equal
to U.S. ones, the European interest rate would have not be different of its actual value.
Besides, we find that the U.S. interest rate would have been even more volatile if they
had been determined by the same shocks as in Europe. Everything happens as if the U.S.
was more sensitive to shocks than the euro area. Both regions do not similarly respond to
shocks. So the interest rate differencial must stem from structural differences.
euro Area with the U.S. Shocks
1999:1 - 2005:4 Variance Variance Equality
Actual EA interest rate 0.92 YES
Simulated EA interest rate 1.21 (SL=0.24)
U.S. with the EA Shocks
1999:1 - 2005:4 Variance Variance Equality
Actual U.S. interest rate 3.72 NO
Simulated U.S. interest rate 18.8 (SL=0.00)
Table 5: Tests on counterfactual interest rate series - Shocks scenario
5 Comparing economic structures
5.1 Counterfactual exercice on economic structures
Firstly, figure 6 enables to compare the inertia degree of the two regions through the re-
sponses of real variables to idiosyncratic shocks. Table 6 offers a measure of this adjustment
speed.
In the euro area, subsequently to a cost-push supply shock, inflation returns to the
equilibrium level (or has no more significant fluctuations) after seven quarters. As shown
in table 6, the inflation dynamics is more viscous in the short run in the euro area than in
the U.S.. A shock on the European labor market has a strongly persistent effect on wages.
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euro Area United States
Reponse of 6 months 1 Year 2 Years 6 months 1 Year 2 Years
pi to a shock on pi 62% 81% 100% 49% 79% 100%
y to a shock on y 24% 43% 72% 35% 57% 75%
w to a shock on w 27% 36% 54% 53% 65% 80%
Table 6: Speed of adjustment of inflation (pi), output gap (y) and wages (w)
It takes about two years for the wage impulse function to be cut by half in the Euroland.
The wage growth is the most viscous variable of the system. Conversely, such a shock
is quickly absorbed by the U.S. labor market (where more than half of the total effect is
absorbed in the first six months, compared to only a fourth in the euro area). Finally, in
the short run (until two years), the output gap has a weaker persistence in the euro area
(24% of the total effect is reached within six months and 43% after a year) than in the
U.S. (respectively 35 and 57%).
The counterfactual experience consists in simulating an European interest rate between
1995 and 2005 if, everything else equals, the European structure had been equal to the U.S.
one (see relation (4)). Results are given in table 7. First, the European interest rate has a
significantly higher variance under the U.S. structure than the effective European rate (3.68
against 0.92). The variance equality test even shows that the simulated European interest
rate is statistically equivalent to the U.S. one (the null hypothesis of variance equality is
accepted with 22% p-value). European inflation and output gap would also be more volatile
if U.S. and European structures would match. The same results emerge in the U.S. case:
the simulated interest rate with the European structure has a significantly lower variance
than the effective rate (1.5 against 3.72). Furthermore, the variance equality between this
simulated rate and the European effective rate is accepted (the p-value is equal to 10%).
Finally, with the European structure, the variances of the U.S. output gap and inflation
are significantly lower.
Therefore, differences in structure explain a large part of the differences in interest rate
volatilities between the two regions. This result is in contradiction with previous studies.
And yet, although the euro area itself is made of countries with quite dissimilar structures,
it is not difficult to show that it differs from the United States if we consider the structure
of financial and production sector, the price rigidity and the labor market.
5.2 Some key features about structural divergences
First, table 12 gives an insight on differences in financing structure. Direct financing is
prevalent in the U.S. where the ratio of outstanding debt securities to GDP is four to
five times higher than in the Eurosystem. European private bond outstandings hardly
represent 2% of total financing of private companies but 25% of the GDP in the U.S.
Another evidence lies in the market capitalisation which is twice as high as in the U.S..
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euro area with the U.S. Structure
1999:1 - 2005:4 Variance Variance Equality
Actual EA interest rate 0.92 NO
Simulated EA interest rate 3.68 (SL=0.05)
Variance Variance Equality
Actual EA output gap 1.02 NO
Simulated EA output gap 9.45 (SL=0.00)
Variance Variance Equality
Actual EA inflation 0.76 NO
Simulated EA inflation 3.99 (SL=0.00)
Simulated EA output gap 9.45 (SL=0.00)
Variance Variance Equality
Actual U.S. interest rate 3.72 YES
Simulated EA interest rate 3.68 (SL=0.00)
U.S. with the EA Structure
Variance Variance Equality
Actual U.S. interest rate 3.72 NO
Simulated U.S. interest rate 1.50 (SL=0.00)
Variance Variance Equality
Actual U.S. output gap 2.91 NO
Simulated U.S. output gap 0.76 (SL=0.00)
Variance Variance Equality
Actual U.S. inflation 0.53 NO
Simulated U.S. inflation 0.25 (SL=0.02)
Variance Variance Equality
Actual EA interest rate 0.92 YES
Simulated U.S. interest rate 1.50 (SL=0.10)
Table 7: Tests on counterfactual interest rate series - Structural scenario
European companies resort to indirect financing more frequently. Bank loans represent
42.6% of GDP in Europe and only 9.6% in the U.S. The importance of banks can be
illustrated by the ratio of bank assets to GDP which is three times higher in Europe. One
can count 0.55 bank branch for 1000 inhabitants in Europe and only 0.29 in the U.S. Also,
the European banking system is caracterized by weak local competition and cross subsidies
between services that prevent specialized companies to offer competitive services. Besides
the euro area has a higher proportion of small companies that are particularly exposed to
changing credit conditions (see last part of table 12). The U.S. is caracterized by a high
proportion of variable interest rate loans and refinancing operations are more frequent, up
to three fourth of new loans (Sellon (2002)). Conversely, in the euro area, loans are mainly
based on fixed interest rates (except in Spain, Portugal and Finland). Besides, a large part
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of household savings and banks’ resources are made of regulated vehicles whose returns do
not necessarily follow the money market interest rates.
These differences must have an impact on monetary policy transmission mechanisms.
The easier substitution between corporate financings and the more frequent changes of
credit conditions make the transmission of monetary impulses faster in the U.S. Finally,
because of the differences described above, the monetary policy is supposed to have a
stronger influence on investment (through the credit chanel) in Europe but on consumption
in the U.S. where the household indebtness has reached an unprecedent level (74% on
average over 1985-2005) and where credit conditions can be easily renegociated.
The production structures are also very different, as shown by table 13. According
to the computations of output gaps, potential growth tends to incrase in the U.S. (from
3.03% to 3.15% between 1990 and 2005) while it slowed down in Europe from 2.53 to
1.70%20. R&D investments offer an explanation for such differences since they represent a
much lower share of GDP in Europe even we take into account R&D from public sector.
Noteworthy, U.S. companies hire more researchers than European ones by a factor from
2 to 6. Obviously, this has an impact on innovation and production capabilities of firms.
There is therefore no surprise that the diversification of high-tech exports is stronger in the
U.S. than France, Italy and Germany. The last rows of table 13 indicate that European
businesses have a slower development path: four years after its creation, the number of
employees in a U.S. company has more than doubled. In France, Germany and Italy, the
growth is more modest and does not exceed 30%. Furthermore, the gap keeps on widening
after seven years. More generally, in accordance with a liberal market economy (LMEs) in
the sense of Hall & Soskice (2001), the United States is characterized by a non-regulated
product market. At the opposite, continental European countries, classified as coordinated
market economies (CMEs), are more regulated. This implies less competitive pressures,
and makes these economies less reactive to shocks (Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Boylaud (2000)).
Consequently, supply inertia is certainly higher in Europe.
Price settings - an other important issue for monetary policy - also differ between the
two regions. Table 14 gives Alvarez & Al. (2005)’s results in a micro-founded analysis
framework. On average, only 15% of prices are revised each month in Europe against
25% in the U.S. A price remains constant for four to five quarters in Europe whereas
only two in the U.S. Beyond that, the euro area is characterized by a susbtantial degree
of heterogenity in the frequency of price changes across products: 95% of products keep
the same price for one to thirty-two months in Europe, compared to one to twenty-two
in the U.S.21. Whatever the product category considered, prices are far more inertial in
Europe than in the U.S. Like Gali, Gertler & Lopez-Salido (2001)’s results on Phillips
curve, macroeconomic models must reflect this stronger inertia of European prices. Note
that this is precisely what is shown for the short term in table 6.
Differences on labor market are even more obvious. Table 15 shows that the employment
and activity rates is 10% higher on average in the U.S. than in Europe. Labor force and
20OFCE (2006) finds exactly the same numbers.
21See Bils & Klenow (2004) for the U.S.
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labor productivity growths are also higher in the U.S.. Furthermore, the unemployment
rate reaches 9% on average in Europe over 1985-2005 but only 5.8% in the U.S. Whereas
the U.S. unemployment rate is close to the NAIRU (5.6%), the European one is rather far
(7.7%). European inflation is then less exposed to labor market pressures. Nevertheless,
focusing on institutional features, one notes that the unionization rate and the proportion
of employees under a collective agreement are higher on average in Europe. Following the
updated classification22 of the very influent contribution by Calmfors & Driffill (1988), some
European coutries have a centralized wage bargainning system (Austria, Belgium, Finland)
while Ireland is fairly centralized and all others are intermediaries economies (bargainning
is made by industries). Both for the coordination between employer association and trade
unions, and the weight of trade unions, the U.S. has a decentralized wage setting (mainly
at the level of individual firms). According to Calmfors & Driffill (1988)’s conclusions, a
decentralized wage setting (as in the U.S.) leads to more restrained wages because if the
wage bargainning takes place at the firm level, the competition and some other subsitute
products reduce the incitation for the company to transfer wage increases into higher
prices. Then, trade unions internalize that employment is the only adjustment variable.
Conversely, in an intermediate system (as in Europe), increases in wages can be more
easily transmitted to prices since all prices of a same industry are concerned (competition
plays no role). Thus, in the euro area, the market power of trade unions exists but their
concentration is too weak for the inflation risk to be internalized in their objectives and
claims. Finally, firing procedures and costs are very low in the U.S. and represent no
constraints when compared with European standards (see last part of table 15). Thus,
generally speaking, wage bargainning, the degree of employment protection, the size of
replacement incomes and economic policies have very little in common between the two
regions. It is therefore obvious that rigidity factors are more important on the European
labor market (Siebert (1997)).
While the CME/LME classification is somewhat restrictive for several intermediate
countries (like the Netherland and Ireland for instance), it is likely to characterize the differ-
ences of interest rate movements between the EA and the U.S.. This overview strengthens
the conclusions of the counterfactual simulations.
6 Assessment and exercice on central banks prefer-
ences
Figure 10 represents the interest rate paths implied by the various scenarios considered. It
is clear that the difference of interest volatility between the U.S. and the EA is mainly ex-
plained by differences of structures. The scenario in which European monetary authorities
conduct their policy with the U.S. structures (everything else being equal) is the only case
in which the variance of the European interest rate is comparable to the variance of the
22See OECD (1997).
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U.S. rate23. On the contrary, the differences between the simulated and the actual interest
rates are not significant in average when shocks or monetary policy rules are switched.
Assuming that central banks behave optimally, it can be theoretically demonstrated
that their (estimated) monetary policy rule responds to the optimization of an objective
function, subject to a given structural model and variance of shocks. Accordingly, it is not
because monetary policy rules can not explain the difference in volatility that European
and U.S. central banks have the same policy preferences. Constraints are not the same, in
particular concerning the economic structures, as we have seen. In this way, the last exercice
consists in determining the preference parameters of policymakers. This task is difficult
to conceive for the euro area, as monetary policy was firstly national (how aggregating
the national preference parameters?) then commonly conducted (on a consensus basis),
whereas the model is estimated for the 1985-2005 period. On the other hand, it is possible
to reveal the deep preference parameters of the Fed, then to apply them to the Euroland
to determine the implied optimal monetary policy rule. Would the European interest rate
be more volatile?
The following method is implemented. We assume the Fed had to minimize the follow-
ing usual quadratic loss function for objective, where λy and λi represent respectively the
preference parameter for output and interest rate variabilities:
Losst = λyV ar(yt) + (1− λy)V ar(pit) + λiV ar (it − it−1) (6)
subject to a given structural model Zt = ΦZt−1 + Ut, a variance-covariance matrix M
associated to the innovation vector U , and a monetary policy rule it = f (X). It can be
demonstrated, following Svensson (1998) and Ball (1997) that the unconditional contem-
poraneous covariance matrix of Z, noted V is given in vector form by:
V ec(V ) = [I − Φ⊗ Φ]−1 V ec(M) (7)
So, the optimal monetary policy rule is given by the parameters of the vector f that
minimize the weighted sum - based on the given preference parameters (λy, λi) - of the
unconditional variances for the inflation rate, the output gap and the interest rate. These
variances appear in V ec(V ), following (7).
This robust method can be used to reveal the U.S. preference parameters. To make
the algorithm optimisation tractable, we reduce the previous U.S. model to three main
variables: interest rate, inflation and output gap. This also allows to concentrate on the
main usual targets of monetary policy rules. We note iˆ the interest rate deduced from the
U.S. estimated monetary policy rule (monetary policy shocks are ruled out). The effective
preference parameters of the Fed, (λ∗y, λ
∗
i ), are those that allow to determine a monetary
policy rule yielding an ’optimal’ interest rate iˆ∗ which is the nearest to the estimated rate
iˆ. The optimization program is then given by:
23In this case, the difference of level is in large part explained by the higher U.S. initial conditions used
to start the simulation.
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
Min
{λy ,λi}
distance =
∑N
t=0
[ˆ
i∗t (λy, λi)− iˆt
]2
with iˆ∗t = f
∗Z such as Min
{f∗}
L = λyV ar(yt) + (1− λy)V ar(pit) + λiV ar(∆it)
with Zt = Φ[f(λy, λi)] + Ut and Z = [yt−1 . . . yt−5, pit−1 . . . pit−5, it−1 . . . it−5]
Results are λy = 0.42 and λi = 5.6. These preference parameters generate an optimal
monetary policy rule with an interest rate path that fits very well the estimated interest
rate, as it is shown by figure 11 (distance=11.62). This result is consistent. On the one
hand, the Fed has an explicit objective of output stabilization (while inflation stability is
its main objective). On the other hand, a high value of λi is required to reproduce the
interest rate inertia (Dennis (2001)). When these parameters are applied to the euro area,
they generate an optimal interest rate path which is more volatile than it is in fact, as
shown by figure 12. This is clearly confirmed by the variance equality tests in table 8.
1985:1 - 2005:4 Variance Variance Equality
Estimated EA interest rate 8.88 NO
Optimized EA interest rate with U.S. preferences 26.54 (SL=0.00)
1999:1 - 2005:4 Variance Variance Equality
Estimated EA interest rate 1.08 NO
Optimized EA interest rate with U.S. preferences 4.25 (SL=0.00)
Table 8: Tests on counterfactual interest rate series - Preference scenario
In fact, the European Policy would require a higher λi. This result can be interpreted
twofold. Either it means that the European MP authorities are very cautious, in the sense
they display a high preference for interest rate smoothing. This behaviour can be justified in
the light of Brainard’s arguments, because of the large uncertainty that surrounds the total
effects of a common European monetary policy. Or, following Woodford (2003, chap. 6), it
can be demonstrated that a loss function like (6) can be derived from the discounted sum
of utility of a representative household. In this cas, parameters (λi, λy) do not represent
the monetary authorities’ preferences per se but convolutions implying some structural
parameters of the underlying model. In this case, this result means that the difference of
volatility between the U.S. and the EA interest rates is explained by structural divergences,
what strengthens our conclusions.
Conclusion
Given the dissimilar variances of the European and U.S. interest rate, the ECB is often
blamed for not being reactive enough in comparison with the Fed. But such a hasty
appraisal forgets that monetary policy must be evaluated in its context, i.e. considering
both the economic structures and the cyclical shocks. In this prospect, several studies
searched to explain the reasons of such an apparent difference of reactivity. As a whole,
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they conclude that the cyclical shocks are mainly responsible. Beyond that, monetary
policies and, more surprising, economic structures would be the same in both areas. But
these conclusions are specious as they a priori assume that the U.S. and EA models are
structurally identical, except the calibration.
So, in this paper, we analyse the reason why the ECB is comparatively and apparently
passive, in the light of a VAR model, which precisely exempts from imposing theoretical
structures a priori. Counterfactual simulations confirm that differences implied by mon-
etary policy rules alone can not explain the dissimilarity of interest rates paths. In the
same way, while cyclical shocks are different in each area, they do not suffice to explain the
factual divergence. Finally, it is the structural dissimilarities which essentially explain the
difference of interest rate variances. In line with the distinction widely agreed between lib-
eral market economies and coordinated liberal economies, we explain the main structural
features that render the EA more rigid than the U.S.. Institutionnal divergences appear so
obvious that it would be difficult to assert that both economies share the same structures.
This conclusion is corroborated by an ultimate exercice which consists in revealing the deep
preference parameters of Fed’s loss function, and then applying them to the European mon-
etary policy. We demonstrate that with such preferences, the European interest rate would
be more volatile. This can lead to think that the European monetary authorities are more
cautious and more prone to interest rate smoothing than the American authorities. But
in a welfare perspective of utility-based loss function, this result tends rather to confirm
the structural divergences between both areas. In sum, a less reactive Central Bank is
not necessarily an institution which is not prompt to act, nor per se an apathetic Central
Bank. This means in this precise case that the ECB conducts the monetary policy of an
inertial economy, which is not very sensitive to shocks.
Certainly, this exercice is a priori subject to the Lucas criticism. However, according to
stability tests, parameters of the estimated models are stable over the 1985-2005 period,
despite the transition from national monetary policies to a common one. Statistically, the
turning point of 1999 is not a significant break point. This result agrees with the reserves
of numerous studies which, without reviewing its theoretical logic, attenuate the practical
significance of the Lucas criticism (cf. Altissimo, Sieviero & Terlizzese (2002), Estrella &
Fuhrer (1999)). Moreover, the latter is here dampened by the uncertainty surrounding the
ECB implementation and policy. Around 1999, economic agents were not able to formulate
well-founded expectations about the European monetary policy. As a result, their attitude
had probably not be different if the ECB chose to follow the Fed’s rule for instance. As a
whole, in this first time of ECB exercice, uncertainty (about monetary policy, structures
and shocks), observation and learning would have be the same whatever the monetary
policy rule.
Regarding existing research based on DGSE models, our conclusions plead for duly
taking account for these structural and more generally this institutionnal differences in
the modelling of U.S. and EA. Modelling both areas the same way, with only different
calibration, as it is widelly done today is not satisfactory. Otherwise it comes to disregard
their own institutionnal and structural particularities.
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7 Appendix
1999:1 - 2005:4 Mean Variance Mean Variance
Equality Equality
Actual EA interest rate 3.08 0.93 YES NO
Actual U.S. interest rate 3.20 3.72 (SL=0.76) (SL=0.00)
Estimated EA interest rate 3.11 1.01 YES NO
Estimated U.S. interest rate 3.20 3.71 (SL=0.83) (SL=0.00)
EA Monetary Policy shocks -0.032 0.055 YES YES
U.S. Monetary Policy shocks 0.006 0.068 (SL=0.57) (SL=0.29)
Table 9: Tests on effective interest rate series
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Figure 1: Fed Fund and ECB Repo Rates
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euro area United States
Number of lags (p∗) = 3 Number of lags (p∗) = 5
Test statistic Signf. Level Test statistic Signf. Level
E
qu
at
io
n
1
(ρ
)
Skewness (Sk=0) 0.010 0.969 Skewness (Sk=0) 0.298 0.276
Kurtosis excess (Ku=0) -0.293 0.606 Kurtosis excess (Ku=0) 0.420 0.453
Jarque-Bera (JB=0) 0.292 0.864 Jarque-Bera (JB=0) 1.841 0.398
Autocorrelation Q-Test (?): Autocorrelation Q-Test:
Ljung-Box Q(3) 0.049 0.997 Ljung-Box Q(3) 3.278 0.350
Ljung-Box Q(6) 3.808 0.702 Ljung-Box Q(6) 7.619 0.261
Ljung-Box Q(9) 8.266 0.507 Ljung-Box Q(9) 9.954 0.354
Ljung-Box Q(12) 10.582 0.565 Ljung-Box Q(12) 17.124 0.145
E
qu
at
io
n
2
(y
)
Skewness (Sk=0) 0.094 0.733 Skewness (Sk=0) -0.065 0.810
Kurtosis excess (Ku=0) 0.325 0.567 Kurtosis excess (Ku=0) -0.338 0.546
Jarque-Bera (JB=0) 0.477 0.787 Jarque-Bera (JB=0) 0.455 0.796
Autocorrelation Q-Test: Autocorrelation Q-Test:
Ljung-Box Q(3) 0.987 0.804 Ljung-Box Q(3) 0.528 0.912
Ljung-Box Q(6) 3.949 0.683 Ljung-Box Q(6) 0.972 0.986
Ljung-Box Q(9) 8.008 0.533 Ljung-Box Q(9) 9.826 0.365
Ljung-Box Q(12) 14.112 0.293 Ljung-Box Q(12) 16.007 0.190
E
qu
at
io
n
3
(w
)
Skewness (Sk=0) 0.054 0.844 Skewness (Sk=0) 0.535 0.057
Kurtosis excess (Ku=0) 0.804 0.157 Kurtosis excess (Ku=0) 0.617 0.271
Jarque-Bera (JB=0) 2.223 0.329 Jarque-Bera (JB=0) 5.276 0.071
Autocorrelation Q-Test: Autocorrelation Q-Test:
Ljung-Box Q(3) 0.431 0.933 Ljung-Box Q(3) 0.660 0.882
Ljung-Box Q(6) 0.798 0.992 Ljung-Box Q(6) 2.846 0.828
Ljung-Box Q(9) 6.206 0.719 Ljung-Box Q(9) 11.30 0.255
Ljung-Box Q(12) 9.287 0.678 Ljung-Box Q(12) 21.46 0.044
E
qu
at
io
n
4
(pi
)
Skewness (Sk=0) -0.054 0.844 Skewness (Sk=0) -0.139 0.609
Kurtosis excess (Ku=0) -0.384 0.498 Kurtosis excess (Ku=0) 0.258 0.645
Jarque-Bera (JB=0) 0.538 0.764 Jarque-Bera (JB=0) 0.500 0.778
Autocorrelation Q-Test: Autocorrelation Q-Test:
Ljung-Box Q(3) 0.198 0.977 Ljung-Box Q(3) 0.380 0.944
Ljung-Box Q(6) 4.761 0.575 Ljung-Box Q(6) 5.156 0.523
Ljung-Box Q(9) 8.448 0.489 Ljung-Box Q(9) 17.513 0.051
Ljung-Box Q(12) 14.297 0.282 Ljung-Box Q(12) 20.386 0.060
E
qu
at
io
n
5
(i
)
Skewness (Sk=0) -0.006 0.980 Skewness (Sk=0) -0.042 0.877
Kurtosis excess (Ku=0) 0.731 0.198 Kurtosis excess (Ku=0) 0.238 0.670
Jarque-Bera (JB=0) 1.804 0.405 Jarque-Bera (JB=0) 0.222 0.894
Autocorrelation Q-Test: Autocorrelation Q-Test:
Ljung-Box Q(3) 2.469 0.480 Ljung-Box Q(3) 0.345 0.951
Ljung-Box Q(6) 4.273 0.639 Ljung-Box Q(6) 3.062 0.801
Ljung-Box Q(9) 6.078 0.732 Ljung-Box Q(9) 5.989 0.741
Ljung-Box Q(12) 10.380 0.583 Ljung-Box Q(12) 10.757 0.549
(?) : Q-Test describes the test for the joint significance of the first k (k = {3, 6, 9, 12}) autocorrelation
coefficients as defined by Ljung & Box. H0 = nullity of these first k coefficients.
Table 10: Elementary statistics on VAR residuals
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Figure 2: Monetary Policy Transmission Channels in euro area and United States
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Figure 3: The relation between prices and wages
H0: stability Hansen Test (1991)(a) Chow Predictive Test(b)
p-value p-value
Long-Term interest rate 0.25 0.09
output gap 0.26 0.60
Wages 0.37 0.86
Inflation 0.15 0.29
Short-Term interest rate 0.14 0.97
(a) Tests the joint constancy of the coefficients and the variance.
(b) Break point in 1999:Q1. Equality of variances is confirmed beforehand.
Table 11: Parameter stability of the EU VAR model
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Figure 4: Relations between prices, wages and output
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Figure 5: Monetary Policy reactions
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Figure 6: Responses of variables to idiosyncratic shocks
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Figure 7: Estimated Interest Rates and Monetary Policy Shocks
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Figure 8: Historical shocks
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Figure 9: Historical Decomposition
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Bank total assets Bank loans to corporate Outstanding debt securities
on PIB (%)(a) sector on PIB (%)(a) of non-financial corporate
sector on PIB (%)(a)
United States 78 9.4 28.9
Euro area 267.1 42.6 6.5
France 276.7 35.7 17.0
Germany 304.3 38.9 2.8
Italy 154.4 42.3 2.4
Stock Market Number of bank Household debt / PIB
capitalisation(b) branch offices per (d)
1000 inhabitants(c)
United States 115% 0.29 74%
Euro area 50% 0.55 -
France - - 41%
Germany - - 66%
Italy - - 26%
Number of firms Number of firms Number of firms
with less than 10 with [10;499] with more than 500
employees (% total)(e) employees (% total) employees (% total)
United States 12 41.4 46.6
Euro area 30.3 39.4 30.3
Source : Eurosystem, Ehrmann & Al. (2002), BIS Annual Report (2000) n. 70.
(a) in 2001. (b) in 2006. (c) in 1998. (d) 1985-2005 average. (e) Source : Kashyap & Stein (1997).
Table 12: Key statistics on financial structures
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Potential Growth(a) Potential Growth Potential Growth
in 1990 in 2000 in 2005
United States 3.03% 3.10% 3.15%
Euro area 2.53% 2.00% 1.70%
Gross private R&D Gross total R&D Number of scientists
expenditure (% of GDP)(b) expenditure (% of GDP) in firms for 10.000
employees
United States 1.94 2.66 73.78
France 1.38 2.18 35.01
Germany 1.71 2.46 39.22
Italy 0.53 1.11 12.86
Total Factor Employment in % of firms entering employment(d)
Productivity(c) After 4 years After 7 years
United States +1.4% 215 226
France +0.9% 115 107
Germany +0.9% 120 122
Italy -0.5% 128 132
(a) Authors’ calculations based on the output gap series used in the VAR models.
(b) Source : OECD, Main Science and Technology 2005. (c) 1995-2005 average.
(d) Source : OECD, Employment Outlook.
Table 13: Key statistics on productive structures
Frequency of price changes by product type (% by month)
Unprocessed food Processed food Energy
United States 47.7 27.1 74.1
Euro area 28.3 13.7 78
industrial goods Services Total
United States 22.4 15 24.8
Euro area 9.2 5.6 15.1
Source : Alvarez & Al. (2005). Interpretation : In the euro area, only 9.2% of
industrial prices are revised each month, against 22.4% in the United States.
Table 14: Key statistics on price formation
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Employment rate(a) Activity rate(a) Working Population growth(a)
United States 70.6% 75.0% 1.3%
euro area 61.2% 67.7% 0.83%
Unemployment rate(a) Labour Productivity NAIRU(c)
growth(b)
United States 5.8% 1.73% 5.6%
Euro area 9.0% 1.17% 7.7%
Trade union density(d) Bargaining Coverage(d) Degree of centralisation(e)
United States 15% 18% Decentralised
France 10% 90% Intermediate
Germany 31% 80% Intermediate
Italy 39% 80% Intermediate
Employment Protection Indices(f)
Total Regular employment Temporary employment
United States 0.2 0.2 0.9
France 3.0 2.3 3.6
Germany 2.2 2.6 1.8
Italy 3.3 2.8 3.8
(a) Source : OECD, Economic Outlook n.80, 2006. 1985-2005 average in %.
(b) 1990-2003 average. Source : OECD Employment Outlook 2004.
(c) 1980-200 average. Source : OECD, Economic Outlook n. 68, chap. 5.
(d) Source : Employment Outlook 2004
(e) Source : Employment Outlook 1997, chap. 3, pp. 70-100. The classification did not change between 1980 and 1994.
(f) Source : OECD. 1990s. The higher the index, the more protected the employment
Table 15: Key statistics on Labour markets
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Figure 10: Simulated EA interest rates
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Figure 11: U.S. optimal and actual interest rates
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Figure 12: Simulated EA optimal interest rate with U.S. preferences
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